Digest of Important Decisions by Editors,
DIGEST OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS
REPORTED BETWEEN JANUARY 15 AND FEBRUARY 12, 1893.
CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.,
RAILROAD COMPANIES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I.
COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases selected by FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.
BILL OF LADING as Collateral Security. See Infra, 2.
CONTRACT.
I. Release of Claim for Personal Injuries-Contract to give
Plaintiff Employment-Damages for Breach.
In settlement of a claim for damages against a railroad company by
an employee, the railroad agreed to pay $ioo and furnish him with per-
manent employment. In return he executed a written release of the com-
pany's liability in regard to his injury. The company discharged him
without cause. Held: The action should be for breach of contract, not
an action of tort for injuries sustained. The parol promise to employ
,plaintiff regularly was sufficient consideration for release. The company
is bound to employ him as long as he is able, ready, and willing to perform
such services as it may have for him to perform. The contract isnotvoid
for uncertainty nor against public policy, the company being a railroad
company, and a quasi public servant, it not being shown that plaintiffwas
incompetent to perform such work as the company may give him. The
employment is not at will of the company, the consideration having been
paid in advance, nor is the contract void under section of statute of frauds
relating to agreement not to be performed within one year, it being a
contract for personal service which may be terminated by death of the
party. Though the written release recites as the consideration as $ioo
paid by company, the plaintiff may show that the verbal promise to give
steady employment formed part of consideration, and was collateral to
release, and that the parties did not intend to embody therein the entire
consideration. Plaintiff may recover, and the measure of damages is the
amount he would have earned under the contract, less what sums he
might have earned elsewhere: Penna. Co. v. Dolan, Appellate Court of
Ind., December 14, 1892, per REINHARD, J., 32 N. E. Rep., 802.
LIENS FOR ADVANCES.
2. Draft Secured by B ill of Lading-Consignor and Consignee.
Advances for the purchase of certain cattle were made by a bank on
the agreement by the parties to the sale that the bank should have a lien
therefor on the cattle until they should be sold by consignees to whom
they were to be shipped, and that a draft for the amount should be drawn
on the consignees against the proceeds of the sale by them. Such draft
COMMERCIAL LAW.
was made and delivered to the bank, with a bill of lading for four car-
loads of the cattle, but no bill of lading was issued for the two remaining
car loads, they being shipped in the name of a third person to enable
him to procure a pass to accompany the bank's agent in charge of the
shipment. The consignees, before selling the cattle, had notice of the
bank's advances and of the draft and bill of lading, and no money was
paid nor any right relinquished by them on account of the shipment.
Held: As to the four carloads included in the bill of lading, that instru-
ment being transferred and delivered as collateral security, the rights of
the pledgee are the same as those of an actual purchaser, so far as the
exercise of those rights is necessary to protect the holder, and the con-
signee cannot appropriate the property to his own use in payment of a
prior debt. As regards the other two carloads, the verbal mortgage and
pledge being accompanied by delivery was good against the consignee
even without notice; consignees occupying the position of factors, and
not having parted with any legal right, or advanced any money on
strength of shipment, stood in no better position than pledgor or
mortgagor. Here, too, there was notice. They, therefore, cannot be
held innocent purchasers for iralue. Following on 'first point: Bank v.
Jones, 4 N. Y., 497; Holmes v. Bank, 87 Pa., 525; Dous v. Bank, 91 U. S.,
618; Bank v. Dearborn, 115 Mass., 219; Emery v. Bank, 25 Ohio St., 360;
Halsey v. Warden, 25 Kan., 128; Bank v. Homeyer,.45 Mo., 145; Means
v. Bank of Randall, U. S. Supreme Court, December 19, 1892, BLATCH-
FORD, J., 13 S. C. Rep., 186.
PARTNERSHIP.
3. Married Women - Right to Enter into Partnershipi with
Stranger; With Htusband.
Under the Michigan constitution and statutes giving to married
women the right to enjoy their property free from any control of their
husbands, and to dispose of it by contract or otherwise as if unmarried,
a married woman may become a partner in a firm of which her husband
is not a member, but may not enter into partnership with her husband,
for this would be to give him a control bver her property inconsistent
with the purpose of the statute: Vail v. Winterstein, Supreme Court of
Michigan, December 22, 1892, LONG, J., 53 N. W. Rep., 932.
Under similar statute of Wisconsin, and for same reason, it was held
that a married woman could not become member of a firm in which her
husband was a partner: Fuller & Puller Co. v. McHenry, Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, December 6, 1892, PINNEY, J., 53 N. W. Rep., 896. Under
similar statutes similar decisions have been given in Massachusetts:
Bowker v. Bradford, 140 Massachusetts, 521; Ohio, Payne v. Thompson,
44 Ohio, 192; Indiana, Scarlett v. Snodgrass, 92 Indiana, 262; Michigan,
Bassett v. Shepardson, 52 Michigan, 3; West Virginia, Corry v. Burgess,
20 West Virginia, 57I ; Texas, Cox v. Miller, 54 Texas, x6; Maryland,
Bradstreet v. Baer, 41 Maryland, i9. Contra, Snow v. Caffe, 122 New
York, 3o8, under a statute giving somewhat broader power to married
women.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
SAV.
4. Fraudulent Misrepresentation-Damages-Right o Rescind
Being Lost.
The plaintiff was induced to part with his property in exchange for
certain mining lands by misrepresentations as to their value as a matter
of fact. The plaintiff was entirely ignorant of the value of mining
properties, and defendant knew of his ignorance and his reliance on
defendant's representations. Held, that he had a right to rely upon the
defendant's representations, the rule caveat emptor did not apply and he
could recover in action on the warranty, though by remaining in employ
of the mining company for several months in an attempt to make it
valuable he has lost his right to rescind: Maxted v. Fowler, Supreme
Court of Michigan, December 22, 1892, MONTGOMERY, J., 53 N. W.
Rep., 924.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Cases seleded by ALBERT B. RONEY.
ToRTs.
i. Actionsfor Death.
Where one domiciled in Kentucky is killed by wrongful act in
Tennessee, suit under the Tennessee statute may be brought by an admin-
istrator in Kentucky, where there is in force a similar statute: Wintuska's
Adm'r v. R. R. Co., Court of Appeals of Kentucky, HoLrT, C. J., Decem,
ber I7, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep., Sig.
2. Liability of Emiloyer-Negligence of Fellow-servant.
Under the common law, both in Alabama and Mississippi, a master
is not liable for an injury inflicted on one servant through the negligence
of a fellow-servant. In Alabama this rule is modified by the Employers'
Liability Act, but no similar law is in force in Mississippi. Plaintiff was
injured while employed on defendant's railroad as a brakeman, the injury
being sustained in Mississippi, through the negligence of his fellow-
servants. Plaintiff, a citizen of Alabama, was working for defendant
under a contract made in that State, and defendant was a corporation
organized under the laws of the same State. Held, that plaintiff could
not recover in Alabama for the injuries, the action not being maintainable
in Mississippi.
The fact that the negligence which produced the casualty transpired
in Alabama will not take the case out of the general rule.
The fact that the contract between the parties was made in Alabama
does not make the Employers' Liability Act a part of the contract, so
that a failure to perform any of the duties prescribed by the Act would
render defendant liable for any consequent injury, wherever received.
R. R. Co. v. Carroll, Supreme Court of Alabama, McCLELLAN, J.,
November 22, 1892, xi So. Rep., 8o3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Cases selected by WILLIAm STRUTHERS ELLIS. 1
FEDERAL.
DuE PROCESS OF LAW.
i. Railroads-Enforcing Liability for Injuries.
Gen. St. IIr, makes every railroad liable in damages for the prop-
erty of persons injured by fire from its locomotives, but allows it to
insure any such property. Held, not a taking of property from a rail-
road without due process of law, or a denial of equal protection, within
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
although the liability thus created is supposed to attach irrespective of
negligence: McCandles v. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., Supreme Court
of South Carolina, December 17, 1892, POPE, J., 16 S. E. Rep., 429.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
2. Trustees.
Rev. St. Ind. 2988, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any
person, association or corporation to appoint a non-resident a "trustee
in a deed, mortgage, or other instrument in writing, except wills, for any
purpose whatever," is in conflict with Article IV, 2, of the Constitution
of the United States, which provides that "citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States:" Sherk v. City of La., FayetteCircuit Court of Indiana, BAKER, J.,
October24, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 857.
STATE.
APPROPRIATIONS.
3. Scalp Bounty.
The Bounty Law (Sess. Laws, 1889, p. 35), providing a premium for
any person who shall kill any wolf, coyote, bear or mountain lion, which
premium shall be paid by the county treasurer, and the amount credited
to such officer in his settlement for State taxes with the State treasurer,
is in conflict with Article V, @3. of the Constitution, which provides that
"no money shall be paid out of the treasury except upon appropriations
made by law, and on warrant drawn by the proper officer in pursuance'
thereof," and is void: Institute v. Henderson, Supreme Court of Colorado,
HOYT, C. J., November 21, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 714.
JURY TRIAL, RIGHT TO.
4. Punitive Damage.
Code i886, 2589, allowing the personal representatives of one whose
death is caused by wrongful act to recover "such damages as the jury
may assess," is punitive in its nature, and requires the jury to assess,
without regard to actual compensation, such damages as they may deem
necessary to effect the punishment of defendant. Railroad Co. v. Shearer,
58 Ala., 672; and Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 59 Ala., 272, followed.
IDuring the temporary absence of Mr. Ellis the cases are selected by
one of the Editors.
CORPORATIONS.
Such statute is not void as interfering with the constitutional guaran-
ties with reference to arrest, conviction, and punishment in criminal
cases: Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. v. Freeman, Supreme Court of Ala-
bama, November 21, 1892, MCCLELLAN, J., II So. Rep., 8oo.
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT. I
5. Politicat Questions-Inequality of Apiortionment-Legisla-
tive Discretion.
Mandamus proceedings to test the validity of apportionment acts of
the legislature present a judicial question of which the courts have juris-
diction, and not a political question, with which it will not interfere.
In an action by the State, on the relation of a legal voter, against the
clerk of the circuit court, sheriff, and auditor of a particular county, to
compel them by writ of mandamus to take the necessary steps to hold the
election of 1892 for senators and representatives under the apportionment
act of March 8, 1879, and to enjoin them from proceeding under Act of
March 5, i891, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, the validity of
the latter act must be determined, though it appears by the complaint
that relator is not entitled to the relief demanded, because Act of March 8,
1879, is itself unconstitutional: Parker v. State, Supreme Court of Indi-
ana, CovFEv, J., December 17, 1892, 32 N. R. Rep., 836. Held, that
though exact equality in apportionment cannot be attained, -the constitu-
tion requires the legislature, in apportioning the State into senatorial
and legislative districts, to approximate as nearly thereto as may be, and
it has no legislative discretion to do otherwise. Act of March 5, 189i, forms
forty-three counties into twenty-two districts, to each of which one sena-
tor is allotted, eleven of which districts, composed of twenty-three
counties, contained 148,496 legal voters, while the other eleven districts,
composed of twenty counties, had only 99,6o9 such voters. Held, that
such apportionment was not such approximation to equality as the Con-
stitution required, since in voting a population of 248, IOS there is a differ-
ence of eleven districts as against the other eleven of 48,887. Act of March
5, I89i , assigning a certain county, containing 8688 less voters than the
senatorial unit, and another county, with 3716 less, each to two sena-
torial districts composed in part of other counties, thus enabling such
small counties to vote for two senators, while many counties containing
four times as many voters as the former county vote for one senator only,
is unconstitutional and void, since it violates the rule requiring approxi-
mate equality in the apportionment. Such act, denying one county,
having more voters than the representative unit, a representative, and
giving certain countie, each having less voters than the representative
unit, a representative each, and also assigning them to certain districts
with other counties, the latter of which are not contiguous, is in violation
of the Constitution, and void..
CORPORATIONS.
Cases seklced by Lzwis LAWRENCE SMITH.
OFFICERS.
I. Diredors-Powers of-Fraud-Stockholder's Suit.
The directors of a corporation have the right to execute a mortgage
CORPORATIONS.
to secure the corporate indebtedness, but that does not include the right
to execute a mortgage to a confederate who is under obligations to carry
the corporation paper, which will result in wrecking the corporation.
Thiq case was held to be an exception to the general -ale that a stock-
holder's suit must be brought in a Court of Equity. Cites Kimmell v.
Stoner, 18 Pa. St., 155 ; Hanley v. Balch, el al., Supreme Court of Michi-
gau, December 22, 1892, McGRATH, C. J., 53 N. W. Rep,, 954.
2. Authority-Execution of-Mortgage-Presumption.
If a deed or contract purport to be sealed with the seal of a corpora-
tion, and it is proven to be signed by the proper agents of the corporation,
the presumption is that the seal was regularly affixed by the proper
authority; and a contract under seal, executed by an agent within the
scope of his appointed power, will be held valid and binding upon the
corporation until evidence to the contrary has been introduced: Boyce v.
Montana Gas Coal Co., et al., Supreme Court of West Virginia, November
26, 1892, ENGLISH, J., 16 S. E. Rep., 5oi.
STOCKHOLDERS.
3. Purchase at an Over-valuation-Liability for.
H being indebted to P, agreed to extend and improve a railroad
owned by him, organize a company and transfer the railroad to it and
give the company's bonds in payment of his debt. He organized the
company and transferred the railroad at a gross over-valuation. Bonds
were issued and delivered to P. The company afterward showed its
insolvency. P obtained judgment on the bonds. Held, that P could
recover against H's assigned estate on account of stock held for H which
he claimed had been paid up by his transfer of the railroad, but on which
in reality, nothing had been paid:- Lloyd, et al. v'. Preston, Supreme Court
of the United States, December i9, 1892, SHIRAS, J., 13 S. C. Rep., 131.
See EQuITY, 2.
4. Subscriion-Enforcing Liability of Non-Resident.
A creditor's bill founded on a judgment recovered in Connecticut
against a corporation of that State cannot be maintained in a United
States Circuit Court in New York against a citizen of that state to enforce
his liability on an unpaid subscription to the stock of the corporation,
when no judgment has been obtained or execution issued against the
corporation within the latter State, and no allegations are made showing
that it is impossible to obtain such judgment: National Tube Works v.
Ballou, Supreme Court of the United States, December I9, 1802, BLATCH-
F ORD, J., 13 S. C. Rep., I65.
ULTRA VmEs.
5. "Who fay Mffake Defense.
Where a bill is filed by a party representing himself to be a mort-
gagee of real estate, for the purpose of enforcing a mortgage which pur-
ports to have been regularly sealed, signed and acknowledged by the
president and treasurer of a corporation chartered under the laws of the
State of New York, which real estate is situated in this State, objection
CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
to the validity of said mortgage cannot be made by the company on the
ground that*it is ultra vires, but must be made by a stockholder or by
stockholders of said company: Boyce v. Montana Gas Coal Co., et al.,
Supreme Court of West Virginia, November 26, 1892, ENGLISH, J., I6 S.
E. Rep., 5o.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Cases selected by C. PERCY WILLCOX.
HoamicIDn.
i. Homicide in Hot Blood-Instructions.
Where the evidence on a trial for murder does not show that there
was any cause to create a " passion" in the defendant, and so reduce the
killing to manslaughter, it is not error for the Court to refuse to instruct
the jury as to the law of manslaughter, but if he does do so on a supposed
state of facts the judgment will not be reversed: WVolffort v. State, 20
S. W., 741, Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, December 17, 1892,
DAVIDSON, J.
LARCENY.
2. Failure to Return Lost Property.
Where defendant found a lady's watch, which was marked with the
family name of the owner, he knowing at the time that ertain ladies
had lost a watch at .or near the same place, the jury were justified. in
finding that he intended to appropriate the property to his own use when
he failed to return it: Stepp v. State, 20 S. 'V., 753, Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, December 14, 1892, SrMKINS, 3.
3. Return of Stolen Propierty.
Where one unlawfully takes another's property and upon detection
hands it back to the owner, it is not a voluntary restitution of the
property: Boze v. State, 20 S. W., 752, Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, December IO, 1892, DAVIDSON, 3.
CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Cases selected by C. PERCY WILLCOX.
INDICTMENT.
i. Witnesses on Bill.
Where an indictment is drawn against two defendants for an affray
and their names marked on the back of bill as witnesses, who were sworn
and examined, but a true bill is returned only as to one of the defendants,
the indictment will not be quashed. The presumption is that they were
examined as witnesses against each other and not each one against
himself: State v. Frizell, 16 S. B., 4o9, Supreme Court of North Carolina,
December 20, 1892, CLARK, J.
JURY.
2. Secret Challenges.
It is reversible error for a Federal judge to direct secret challenges
EQUITY.
to be made from separate jury lists, each side being ignorant of the
challenges the other side has made: Lewis v. U. S., 13 S. C. Rep., 136,
Supreme Court of United States, December 5, 1892, SHIRAS, J.
EQUITY.
Cases selected by ROBERT P. BRADFORD.
ASSIGNMENTS.
i. Fraud-When Within Revised Statutes, 502 I-Preferences.
A judgment and execution against the makers of promissory notes
were set aside in a suit, by the makers' assignee in bankruptcy, as con-
stituting an unlawful preference within the purview of the bankrupt
law; the attorneys who procured the judgment having been the makers'
attorneys, and aware of their insolvent condition, and of their desire that
the holder should be preferred. But it was held that the action of the
holder of the notes in procuring such judgment, and issuing such execu-
tion, did not amount to actual fraud, within the meaning of 5021,
as amended in x874, providing that, in cases of actual fraud on the part
of the creditor, he shall not be allowed to prove for more.than a moiety
of his claim; and that the holder of the notes was not precluded by these
acts from maintaining an action on the notes against the indorser, who-
was not a party to the original suit: io6 N. Y., 186, affirmed; Streeter v.
Jefferson County National Bank, Supreme Court of the United States,
SHIRAS, J., January 3, 1893, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 236.
CORPORATIONS.
2. Bill by Stockholders-Laches.
While a minority of the stockholders of a corporation may maintain
a bill in equity, in behalf of themselves and other stockholders, for fraud,
conspiracy or acts ultra vires, against a corporation, its officers or others
who participated therein, when the minority stockholders have been
injured by said act they must act promptly, and not wait an unreason-
able time. If they postpone their complaint for an unreasonable time
they forfeit their right to equitable relief. Nothing will call a court of
equity into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence.
When these are wanting the court is passive and does nothing. And where
a stockholder has notice or the means at hand of becoming acquainted
with the contracts made by the corporation in which he is such stock-
holder, a court of equity will not allow him to remain quiet an unreason-
able length of time, with a view of ascertaining whether the contract
will result in. profit to him, and then repudiate the contract if it has
resulted in loss: Boyce v. Montana Gas Coal Co, et al., Supreme Court
of West Virginia, November 26, 1892, ENGLISH, J., 16 S. E. Rep., 501.
INJUNCTIONS.
3. Consiracy-Coerdng Empifiloyees to Leave Empfiloyment.
An injunction will lie to restrain persons from attempting by force,
menaces, or threats to prevent workmen from working on such terms as
EQUITY.
.they may agree on with any employer: Murdock, et at. v. Walker, e al.,
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, pier curiam, 1892, 25 AtI. Rep., 492.
SZT-OFr.
4. Preferences-Balance al Banks.
Revised Statutes, H 5234, 5236, 5242, which require a piro rata
distribution of the assets of an insolvent national bank and forbid prefer-
ences, do not invalidate liens, equities and rights arising prior to and not
in contemplation of insolvency. A promissory ilote was executed to a
national bank in consideration of the amount being placed to the credit
of the maker on the books of the bank. The maker thought, and had
good reason for thinking, that the bank was solvent, but the managing
officer of the bank knew it to be insolvent. Before the note matured the
charterwas forfeited for insolvency and a receiver appointed. Held, that
the undrawn balance should be allowed as an equitable set-off to the note,
and such allowance is not a "preference" forbidden by the National
Banking Law: Rev. St., P 5234, 5236, 5242, 36 Fed. Rep., 63, reversed;
Scott v. Armstrong; Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank, et al. z
Armstrong, Supreme Court of the United States, FUr..ER, C. J., December
12, 1892, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 148.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
s. ,greement to Adopt.
B agreed in writing to adopt R, and leave her his property at
his death, and her parents, in consideration thereof, surrendered all
control over her, and she lived with him as his child until her death.
Held, that the surrender by the parents of all control of F was a valuable
consideration for B's promise to adopt her, and that R's heirs would be
entitled to a specific performance of the agreement by which B agreed
that she should inherit his property at his death, though the instrument
of agreement was not sufficient to constitute an adoption : Healey, et al.
v. Simpson, et al., Supreme Court of Missouri, THOMAS, J., December 19,
1892, 2o S. V. Rep., 881.
6. Delivery-Statute of Frauds.
Where an agreement for the sale of laud, after being signed by the
owners, is put into the custody of a person to be delivered to the pur-
chasers on his being satisfied of their financial responsibility, and he
refuses to deliver it, the purchasers cannot compel specific performance,
though they are in fact financially responsible, and in such a case there
is no delivery to satisfy the Statute of Frauds: Callanan, el al. v. Chapin,
et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, LATHROP, J., January
11, I893, 32 N. R. Rep., 941.
TRUSTEES.
Non-Resident. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
7. Ex-maleficio.
Where the defendant (a stranger to the title) obtains a conveyance
from the plaintiff's grantor of the same land by representing to her, or
giving her to understand, that it is in support of her original defective or
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invalid deed to the plaintiff, he will be considered a trustee of the title for
the plaintiff. To render the defendant chargeable as trustee it is not
necessary that he should have sustained a fiduciary relation to the
plaintiff as respects the title, or that the plaintiff should have had some
claim to the land which he could have enforced against the grantor in
the deed. The rights of the third person, in such cases, depends not
upon his having some legal or equitable claim to the property before the
constructive trust was created, but upon the fact that he acquired such
right by the trust, as being the party for whose benefit the property was
intended by the owner: Rollins v. Mitchell, et al. (Marvin, Intervenor),
Supreme Court of Minnesota, MITcHZILL, J., December 23, 1892, 53 N. W.
Rep., 1020.
EVIDENCE.
PAROL.
To Vary Written Agreement. See COMMBRCIAL LAW, I.
BILL OF LADING.
As Collateral Security. See COMMnRcIAtL LAW, 2.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNE R. LONGSTRETH.
CITY CouNcIrs.
x. Franchise-Power to Grant to Electric Railway.
Where the charter of a city (New Orleans) provided that the common
council shall have power to authorize the use of the streets for "horse and
steam railroads," the words "horse and steam railroads" are not, 6er se,
words of limitation, and the council is empowered to grant such franchise
to electric railways; for the public good requires that the common coun-
cil should be at liberty to place at the service of the public street railroads
with all the valuable improvements in the means of propulsion which the
ever-advancing spirit of invention and science should from time to time
discover, the matter of the public safety and convenience being left to
the consideration of council: Buckner v. Hart, United States Circuit
Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, BILINGS, D. J., November 18, 1892,
52 Fed. Rep., 835.
ELECTIONS.
2. "Test Oath" Laws, Validity of.
A statute requiring an elector, as a prerequisite to registration and
the right to vote, to swear that he had not done certain acts, is valid if it
does not add to, or alter, the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution;
or even then if the power to prescribe the qualifications of voters has
been conferred upon the legislature: Shepherd v. Grimmett, Supreme
Court of Idaho, per Curiam, October 18, 1892, 31 Pac. Rep., 793.
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HIGHWAYS.
3. Plotting-Designation of Termini- Viewers' Reort.
A report of viewers, and draft accompanying the report, which sim-
ply indicate the proposed road as starting from an undesignated and unde-
scribed place on the side or margin of a road, and ending at an undesig-
nated and undescribed place on a street, are fatally defective. Designat-
ing a point in a public road a snear a borough or township line, or near
the corner of a property owner is too indefinite: O'Hara Township
Road, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, GREE,, J., January 3, 1893, 152
Pa. St., 319.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
4. De Facto Liabiliyfor Salary of Ojice, s.
(i) Before the Act of Congress of May 2, r892, which extended over
Oklahoma the laws of Nebraska, the original government of Oklahoma
City was not a de facto corporation, and had no authority to bind itself or
its successors by any agreement. But from the time de jure corporations
were authorized, Oklahoma City became a defirnlo corporation, and when
this was subsequently chaiged to a dejure corporation, the latter became
liable for the valid contracts of the former; and plaintiff, who acted as
clerk of the common council for the city during its defaco existence, is
entitled to recover his salary for such period from the dejure corporation.
(2) But if, during the same period, plaintiff acted as recorder for the
city he cannot recover for such service, because the laws of Nebraska,
under which the defacto city was acting, made no provision for such an
officer in cities of that class: Blackburn v. Oklahoma City, Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, BURFORD, J., January 6, 1893, 31 Pac. Rep., 782.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
5. Abandonvient of Ofice.
When a statute changing Logan County to Lincoln County is declared
unconstitutional, the duly elected probate judge of Logan County, who
has accepted the appointment to be probate judge of the new county of
Lincoln, cannot oust from office a person who has in the meantime been
appointed to be probate judge of Logan County; for a discontinuance of
the exercise of official functions, in obedience to a statute which is after
ward declared to be unconstitutional during the continuance of the term-
does not effect an abandonment, or an estoppel to claim the office: Hamp--
ton v. Dilley, Supreme Court of Idaho, HousToN, J., December 26, 1892,
21 Pac. Rep., 807.
6. Removal by Govern or.
When a statute empowers a governor to suspend an elective officer
for cause, and also to remove by and with the advice of the senate, the gov-
crnor has the sole power to bear and decide as to the existence of the
cause, and so long as his action in suspending is within his constitutional
power, the courts cannot interfere to arrest his action. He is the exclu-
sive judge, so far as the courts are concerned, of the sufficiency, of the
proof of the charge, not merely because the courts have been given no
PATENTS.
power to review, but also because the senate has been granted such power:
State v. Johnson, Supreme Court of Florida, RAINY, C. J., December 19,
1892, 11 So. Rep., 845.
TAXATION.
7. Review of Assessment, Time for.
Where a statute relating to the correction of erroneous assessment,
provides that the board of review shall meet on a certain day and places
the provision as to time and place of meeting is mandatory and a condi-
tion precedent to any further proceedings, and where a taxpayer appears
and is deprived of a hearing by a previous adjournment of the board, it
vitiates the tax against him even though the assessment is shown to be
just: Township of Caledonia v. Rose, Supreme Court of Michigan,
GRANT, J., December 22, 1892, '53 N. W. Rep., 522.
MUTUAL RELATIONS.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I. Wife as Husband's Partner. See COMMERCIAL LAW, 3.
PATENTS.
Cases selected by HECTOR T. FENTON.
CLAIM.
i. Amendment by Requirement of Patent Office-Acquiescence-
Esto~ppel.
The patentee claimed "the treatment of the prepared rawhide in the
manner and for the purpose set forth; " and described a treatment con-
sisting of removing the hair by a sweating process, drying, moistening
and pulling, and other processes common in the treatment of hides,
together with the application of a certain mixture of tallow, wood tar,
and resin, and a second pulling process. The specification also stated
that the patentee avoids the use of lime, acid or alkali, and that the use
of a preparation substantially like that described was essential to make
the hide .useful and durable for belting The patent office rejected claims
solely for the pulling operation, and for the preserving mixture, on the
ground of want of novelty, which rejections were acquiesced in by the
patentee. Held, that the claim was to be construed as covering the
whole process, and was not infringed by a process wherein the hair was
removed by lime: Royer v. Coupe, et al, Supreme Court U. S., Decem-
ber 19, 1892. 13th Sup. Ct. Reporter, 166, affirming 38 Fed. Rep., 113.
CONSTRUCTION.
2. Limiling Words in Claim.
Where in a suit on a patent containing in its claims an unnecessary
limitation inserted by requirement of the Patent Office without sufficient
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reason, as afterward disclosed by the evidence of the state of the act, the
expressed limitation cannot be eliminated by the Court by construction,
and must be given its due effect accordingly: Syracuse Chilled Plow Co.
v. Strait, N. D. New York, WALLACE, J., November 28, 1892, 52 Fed.
Rep., 870.
INTERFERENCE.
3. Presumpfition after Hearing by Patent Office-Aggregation.
Where a later patent, in suit, was issued on an application, filed after
issuance of a prior patent to another for the same invention, in pursuance
of a decision by the patent office in interference proceedings with such
prior patent, the legal presumptions are that the patentee was the first
inventor of the device patented, and his patent fprima facie evidence
thereof. In the case at bar, the evidence of the state of the act disclosed
that car brakes bad been known similar to the patentee's, but with a
single pair of toggle levers to one brake-shoe. Held, that by the employ-
ment of two pairs of such toggle levers a new and useful result was
obtained, which was not a non-patentable aggregation of elements:
Pacific Coke Ry. Co. v. Butte City Ry. Co., Dist. of Montana, KNOWxES,
D. J., November 2r, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 863.
LICENSE.
4. Action for Inf-ingement-Parties.
A, a railroad company, having been licensed, under a patent, to
"make and use" a certain improvement in railroad signals, accepted a
proposal of defendant (not its employee) to make and set up a set of
said signals. Held, that the manufacturer was guilty of infringement,
and could not justify, as an employee of the railroad company, under its
aforesaid license. Held, also, that the owner of a naked license to make
and use is not a necessary party to a suit for infringements : Union Switch
and Signal Co. v. Johnson Railroad Signal Co., District of New Jersey,
GREEN, D. J., November 16, 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 867.
5. Rights of License Under-lssignment of License.
Where a patentee granted an exclusive territorial license, authority
to the licensee is implied to join the owner of the legal title, even against
his will, as a party plaintiff in suits against infringers within the licensed
territory. An assignment by the licensee of divisional portions of the
licensed territory is not sufficient to convey all his rights under the
license, and cannot be inferred from the use of the "assigns" in the
original grant, unless a manifest intent to confer such power appears
clearly therein. Where the invention and right to the patentee was
assigned before its issue, and the assignee granted a territorial license
under such assignment, and after issue of patent treated such grantee as
having a valid license and alloived it to acquire a business thereunder, he
is estopped from denying the validity of the license: Brush Electric Co.
v. California Electric Light Co., Circ. Ct. Appeals. 9th Circ., McKENNA
and GILBFRT, Circ. JJ., and KN-OwlI'.S, D. J., October 6, 1992, Fed.
Rep., 945.
PRACTICE AND PLEADING.
PRACTICE AND PLEADING.
Cases selected by AiuDmAus STEWART.
I PRACTICE.
AVFIDAVITS.
i. Bill of Exceptions-Contents.
Affidavits used at the hearing of a motion in the District Court, to be
available in the Supreme Court, must be brought'into the record by a bill
of exceptions: Wohlenberg v. Melchert, Supreme Court of Nebraska,
NORVAI,, J., December 16, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 982.
APxAL.
2. Aipealable Orders-Removal of Causes-Remand.
An order remanding a cause to the State Court from which it has
been removed is not a final decree, and no appeal will lie therefrom to the
Supreme Court: Railroad Co. v. Thouron, io Sup. Ct. Rep., 517, 134 U.
S.; 45; Gurnu v. Patrick Co., ii Sup. Ct. Rep., 34, 137 U. S., 141;
McLish v. Roff, 12 Sup. CL Rep., 118, 141, U. S., 661; Railroad Co.
v. Roberts, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep., 123, 141, U. S., 69o, followed; Joy, et al.
v. Adelbert College of Western Reserve University, et al., Supreme Court
of the United States, FULLER, C. J., February 6, 1892, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
186.
3. Jurisdictional Amount.
In a proceeding brought by the United States in a territorial court
to abate a wire fence under the act of February 25, 1885 (23 St. at Large,
p. 321), -which forbids the inclosure of public lands by one having no
"claim or color of title," etc., defendant justifie'd under a Mexican grant;
and the issue, therefore, was as to whether he had color of title. The
Court rendered judgment for the United States, which was affirmed by
the Territorial Supreme Court, and an appeal was taken. The only evi-
dence as to the amouit in dispute consisted of the affidavits of certain
persons, and the finding of the chief justice that the property in contro-
versy exceeded $5,ooo, but these evidently referred to the value o'f the
land inclosed. Held, that the jurisdiction was to be determined by the
value of the color of title to the property, and, as there was no evidence
of its value, the appeal must be dismissed: Cameron v. United States,
Suprem6 Court of the United States, BROWN, J., December i9, 1892, 13
Sup. Ct. Rep., 184.
4. Running of Time.
Where an appeal is a matter of right, the running of the time within
which it may be taken is stopped by the filing of the appeal bond, but
where the appeal depends upon discretion or allowance, the time of limita-
tion runs until the application or petition for appeal is presented: Womer
* v. Ravenswood, S. & G. Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, LUCAS, J., December io, 1892, 16 S. R. Rep., 488.
ARBITRATION.
5. Common Law Award--En/forcement.
Plaintiff and defendant agreed upon an arbitration, stipulating that
two arbitrators, without being sworn, might make an award, without set
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times or an appointed place for their proceedings; that they might obtain
such information as they deemed best, anything in the code of civil pro-
cedure to the contrary notwithstanding; that, if they failed to agree, they
should choose a third, and the decision of a majority should be final;
that the submission should be filed with the clerk, and entered as an
order of the superior court; that after entry neither party should ask for
any reduction, exception, new trial, or appeal therefrom, but it should
have all the force of a final judgment of the court of last resort. Held,
that since the parties intentionally ignored the material provisions of the
statute on arbitrations, the submission, as a statutory submission, was
void, and the award cannot be enforced as a judgment, though it is good
as a common-law award, and the basis of an action : Kreiss v. Hotaling,
Supreme Court of California, PATERSON, J., December 2, I892, 31 Pac.
Rep., 740.
JUDGMENT.
6. Against "Defendants " - Construction- Examination of
Record.
Where, in an action against several defendants, judgment is rendered
against the "defendafits," the Court will look into the entire record, and
if it is apparent that the judgment was intended to be against only a part
of the defendants it will be so construed : City Nat. Bank 6f Denver v.
Hager, et al., Supreme Court of Minnesota, MAITCHELL, J., December 23,
1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 867.
MANDAMUS.
7. To Canvassers of Elections to Compel Recount.
After the board of canvassers has declared a candidate elected, and
on recount the former declaration was affirmed and the board adjourned,
mandamus will not lie to compel the board to reassemble and make a full
and detailed report of the ballots objected to by the petitioner, and to
count or reject certain specified ballots, since, having recounted and
declared the result and adjourned, the board becomesfunctus officio, and
the remedy of a party claiming to be aggrieved is by a quo warranto to
test the validity of the election: Packard v. Board of Canvassers of
Menominee County, Supreme Court of Michigan, per Curiam, Decem-
ber 24, 1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 934.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
8. Time of 4pplication.
Under Act of Congress, August 13, 1888, 3 (25 St. at Large, p. 433),
which provides that a defendant mayremove a cause at the time or before
he is required by the State law or rule of Court to plead or answer, a
petition for removal filed after the statutory period for answering has
expired comes too late, even though filed within the time allowed for
answering by order of Court, where such order is based on a stipulation
entered into after expiration of the statutory period : Rock Island Nat.
Bank v. J. S. Keator Lumber Co., et al., Circuit Court N. D. Illinois,
S D. BLODGFTT. D. J., October 3 r , 1892, 52 Fed. Rep., 897.
TORTS.
PLEADING.
AvFIDAVIT.
9. Sufficiency Attachment.
In attachment for a debt evidenced by two notes, a motion to quash
cannot be sustained on the ground that the affidavit on which it was
obtained does not show when the second note sued on, which is not yet
due, will become due; for it is sufficient if the affidavit contains a plain
statement of what the indebtedness consists of, and what portion is not
due: Hinzie v. Moody, et at., Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, GARRETT,
C. J., October 14, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep., 789.
GENERAL ISSUE.
io. Assumpit-Set-Off-Special Notice.
In assumpsit, under the general issue with notice of a specific claim
of set-off, defendant cannot set up an additional claim: Cleveland v.
Miller, Supreme Court of Michigan, MONTGOMERY, J., December 22,
1892, 53 N. W. Rep., 961.
JOINDER Ol CAUSES.
ii. Action in Different Rights.
A cause of action by an administrator, in the right of his decedent,
for suffering an expense caused by defendant's negligence, may be
joined to a count in the right of decedent's wife and children for the
wrongful death, caused by the same negligence: Ranney v. Railroad Co.
(Vt.), 24 At. Rep., 1053, followed, Preston v. St. Johnsbury and L. C. R.
Co., Supreme Court of Vermont, General Term, TAFT, J., September I x,
1892, 25 At.. Rep., 486.
TORTS.
Cases selected by ALEXANDER DURBIN LAUER.
ACTION.
i. Distinction Between in Tort and in Contract.
A complaint against a railroad company alleged that defendant's ser-
vants failed to stop the train at a certain flag station, the destination
named in plaintiffs ticket, but ran over two miles beyond, where it came
to a halt; that such servants wilfully deceived him as to the distance it
was from that point to the flag station and caused him to get off the train
at a late hour of night, when it was dark, cold and rainy; that in making
his way back to the flag station he slipped and fell, thereby sustaining
injuries, physical and mental. Held, that as the gravamen of the action
was breach of duty it was an action in tort: Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.
Co. v. Roemer, Texas Court of Appeals, October 26, 1892, FISHER, C. J.,
20 S. W. Rep., 843.
DECEIT.
2. Representations by Executor.
The plaintiff paid out certain moneys for the benefit of the estate of
her father, on the representation of defendant, the executor, that the
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estate was solvent and would repay the same. The estate proved insol-
vent. Held, that the payment did not create a debt allowable and pay-
able out of the estate, and, therefore, the representation is in an action
of deceit immaterial : Winshon v. Young, Supreme Court of Minnesota,
December 16, 1892, per GILFILLAN, C. J., 53 N. V. Rep., loi5.
LIBEL.
3. Privileged Communication.
Alleged slanderous statements, uttered in the course of a judicial
proceeding in the Recorder's Court of the city of Galveston, Texas, if
reasonably pertinent to such proceeding, are privileged in a criminal
action : Hix v. The State, Court of Criminal Appeals, Texas, December
31, 1892. per SlMKINS, J., 20 S. W. Rep., 832.
NEGLIGENCE OF FELLow SERVANT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2.
PROPERTY.
4. Use of-R. R. Co.'s Liabilityfor Escaping Steam.
A railway company, in the legitimate transaction of its business, has
the right to use steam, and is not liable for the proper and necessary use
of the same, even if it result in injury to others, as by frightening horses
and causing them to run away. If, however,-an engineer within a city,
where teams are constantly passing, needlessly and unnecessarily opens
the valves of his engine, and frightens such horses and causes them to
run away and commit injury, the company will be liable, provided the
plaintiff is free from contributory negligence: Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co.
v. Clarke, Supreme Court of Nebraska, January 3, 1893, per MAxWELL,
C. J., 53 N. W. Rep., 970.
STREET RAILWAY COMPANIES.
5. Responsibility of, for Defective Street Repair.
A street railway company, which has contracted with a city as a con-
sideration for its franchise to keep a portion of its streets in good order
and repair, is responsible in direct action by any person %vho suffers
special damage resulting from its unlawful failure to do so: Ober v.
Crescent City R. Co., Supreme Court of Louisiana, December 5, 1892, per
FENNER, J., II So. Rep., 818.
WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Cases selected by' MAURICE G. BELKNAP.
WILLS.
PRECATORY WORDS.
i. Construction-Estate in Fee.
A will containing the provision, " I give and bequeath to my loving
wife, Rhoda, all my property, real and personal, for her support, during
her natural lifetime; any remainder at her decease to be disposed of by
308 WILLS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
her as she-may think just and right among my children," gives the
widow a fee with all its incidents, including the power to sell and to
devise. * The words referring to "any remainder" do not limit the wife's
estate or the preceding words of 'the gift, but are precatory. Nor do the
words of confidence used destroy the wife's estate, and make her a trustee
for all the children, so that she could not change their relative rights, or
interfere with the estate, further than to use its income during her
natural life; because the intention of the testator to create a trust must
be apparent apart from the mere existence of words of trust and con-
fidence, or none will be held to exist: Boyle v. Boyle, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, WILLIAMS, J. 25 Atl. Rep., 494-
2. Construction-Relation of the Parties.
The relation of the testator to the legatee should be regarded in con-
sidering whether a precatory trust has been created. Where the legatee
is the wife of the testator, the language is construed more forcible than
if they were strangers: Murphy v. Carlin, Supreme Court of Missouri,
BRACE, J., December 22, X892, 20 S. W. Rep., 786.
3. Reasonable Provision.
Where a will, after directing the payment of debts and a fewlegacies,
devised all the estate absolutely to the testator's wife, but, further, pro-
vided that "It is my wish and desire that my wife continue to provide
for the care and education of T. M., now aged nearly five years, who has
been raised as a member of my family since'his infancy, and to make
'suitable provision for him in case of her death, providing that he con-
tinue a dutiful child to her, and shows himself worthy of such considera-
tion," it was held, that a precatory trust was created, and that an allow-
ance by the Court of $io,ooo out of a personal estate of $85,000 was not
excessive, the child always having been treated as a son, and reared in
luxury: Murphy v. Carlin, Supreme Court of Missouri, BRAcE, J.,
December 22, 1892, 20 S. W. Rep., 786.
